In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver's detector channels may depend differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can control the spatial mode to break security. We experimentally investigate a standard polarization QKD receiver, and identify sources of efficiency mismatch in its optical scheme. We model a practical intercept-and-resend attack and show that it would break security in most situations. We show experimentally that adding an appropriately chosen spatial filter at the receiver's entrance is an effective countermeasure.
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Although quantum key distribution (QKD), in theory, claims to provide unconditional security [1] [2] [3] [4] , its practical implementations do not. New security breaches are still being reported, exploiting the deviations of the actual behavior of the devices from the ideal one [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . One of the properties that separates the security of practical QKD from the ideal is the reliance on symmetry of detection efficiency across received quantum states [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . The aim of this study is to investigate how variations in spatial mode of incoming light in a free-space QKD system lead to detector efficiency mismatch [16] . (While finishing writing this Letter, we became aware of a recent similar work [17] .) We focus on the receiver designed for polarization encoding free-space QKD. We begin by sending an attenuated laser beam to the receiver with various angle offsets and recording the relative detection probability in each channel, to find incidence angles with high efficiency mismatch. With these data, we model an attack using practical devices allowed by today's technology, and verify Eve's ability to steal the secret key. We discuss countermeasures afterwards.
Free-space QKD typically uses a receiver consisting of a telescope to reduce the size of a collimated beam, followed by a non-polarizing beamsplitter to randomly choose between two measurement bases, followed by polarization beamsplitters and single-photon detectors to measure photons in the four states of polarization: horizontal (H), vertical (V), +45
• diagonal (D), and −45
• antidiagonal (A) [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . The receiver we test in this work is a prototype for a quantum communication satellite [27] , operating at 532 nm wavelength [ Fig. 1(a,c) ]. Its telescope consists of a focusing lens L1 (diameter 50 mm, focal length f = 250 mm; Thorlabs AC508-250-A) and collimating lens L2 (f = 11 mm; Thorlabs A397TM-A). The collimated beam of 2 mm diameter then passes through a 50:50 beamsplitter BS (custom pentaprism [27] ) and pairs of polarization beamsplitters PBS1 and PBS2 (Thorlabs PBS121). The purpose of PBS2 is to increase the polarization extinction ratio in the reflected arm of PBS1. Lenses L3 (f = 18.4 mm; Thorlabs PAF-X-18-PC-A) focus the four beams into 105 µm core diameter multimode fibers (Thorlabs M43L01) leading to singlephoton detectors (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-12-FC).
To scan the receiver sensitivity versus beam's incidence angle, we used a source of nearly-circularly-polarized collimated light [ Fig. 1(a) ]. Eve's source consisted of a fibercoupled 532 nm laser, attenuator A, polarization controller PC, and a collimating lens (Thorlabs C220TME-A) mounted on a two-axis motorised translation stage (Thorlabs MAX343/M). The translation stage allowed to change simultaneously the beam's incidence angle and lateral displacement at Bob's front lens L1. Before the scan, the optics in Bob's apparatus was carefully adjusted to maximize coupling into all his detectors at beam's normal incidence; this is the same alignment procedure that is used to prepare it for QKD. Note that many free-space QKD systems employ a real-time tracking system to keep the pointing angles of Alice to Bob and Bob to Alice very close to this initial alignment [22, 23, 26, 28] . We then scanned the incoming beam's angle (φ, θ), recorded the count rate of all four detectors at each angle, subtracted each detector's background count rate, and finally normalized by dividing by the maximum observed count rate in that detector.
A preliminary angular scan showed several features, highlighted in Fig. 1(b) . Around φ = θ = 0, most of the photons were coupled into the fiber core, resulting in the central peak . As the incidence angle increased, the focused beam started to miss the fiber core, and the detector count dropped off . However, when the angle reached a certain value, the beam hit a polished edge of PBS2 and was reflected back into the fiber core causing a high side peak . At still higher incidence angles, the bly edges of other lens mounts and round elements in the optical assembly. It was scattered at these edges, producing two ring-like features . Beyond these features, there were no noticeable counts other than background, as the beam completely missed the receiver aperture.
The receiver setup was then adjusted to minimize the peak , and final scans were taken at 26.1 m distance.
The beam at L1 was Gaussian-shaped and had 9 mm width (at 1/e 2 peak intensity). The scan was done in steps of 38.3 µrad covering ±1.84 mrad range, corresponding to lateral displacement of ±48 mm which covered the entire clear aperture of L1. Figure 2 shows the normalized detection efficiency in all four receiver channels as a function of (φ, θ). Most of the original features are still visible in these scans. However, outside the narrow central range of angles close to φ = θ = 0, individual channel's efficiencies vary independently, resulting in efficiency mismatch between channels. There is a significant difference of size and shape of the central peak between the channels. This was not noticed during the normal QKD alignment procedure, which run unaffected. Possible sources of it are imprecision in focusing, a small optical path length difference between the arms, slightly off-centered alignment of lenses, mode-dependent bending loss in the fibers, and individual variations of components. These may have also caused the efficiency at one side of the outer ring being higher. Because of the aforementioned reasons, there exist angles such that if photons are sent at those angles, one channel has a much higher click probability than the rest.
To emphasize the threat of this spatial-mode efficiency mismatch, we used this result to model a practical intercept-and-resend attack [29] on our system based on the following assumptions. Alice and Bob perform nondecoy-state Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol using polarization encoding. Alice emits a weak coherent pulse of a mean photon number µ equal to the line transmittance Alice-Bob [3] . Whenever Bob registers a multiple click, khe performs a squashing operation to map it to a corresponding single qubit (a double-click in one basis is assigned a random value in that basis, while multiple clicks in different bases are discarded) [30] [31] [32] . To detect Eve, Alice and Bob monitor the total sifted key rate, which Eve thus has to match, and the quantum bit error ratio (QBER). Eve has information about Alice's and Bob's apparatuses and receiver characteristics described above. Eve only uses devices available in today's technology. She intercepts photons at the output of Alice, using an active basis choice and superconducting nanowire detectors, with her overall detection efficiency η e = 0.85 and dark count probability < 10 −9 per bit slot [33] . Then, a part of her situated close to Bob generates a weak coherent pulse with the same polarization as her measurement result, and sends it to Bob. We further assume that Alice-Eve and Eve-Bob polarization visibilities are equal to Alice-Bob visibility F = 0.99, and Eve-Bob visibility is preserved at all illumination angles shown in Fig. 2 .
From Eve's point of view, she wants to maximize the detection probability when Bob measures in the compatible (i.e., the same as her) basis, in order to maximize the mutual information Eve-Bob. At the same time, she wants to minimize Bob's detection probability in the non-compatible basis to minimize QBER. Let η i (j) be the efficiency of Bob's i-th channel (i ∈ {h, v, d, a}) given that incoming light is j ∈ {H, V, D, A} polarized. Thus to find attack points for the j-th polarization, we choose angles that have higher values of η j (j) and
ηnc1(j) , where η nc0 , η nc1 are the normalized efficiencies of the two detectors in the noncompatible basis. Our experimental attack angles are shown in the the rightmost plot in Fig. 2 . For example, the H attack angles were composed of points for which η h (H) ≥ 0.2 and δ h (H) ≥ 75. Similarly, for the V, D and A attack angles,
The thresholds used here to find the attack angles were not optimal, and were picked manually.
To derive the key rate and QBER formula in the presence of Eve, we start with a system with only Eve and Bob. Let's consider the scenario when Eve sends an Hpolarized pulse to Bob within the attack angles H. Before squashing, the raw click probability p i (j) that detector i in Bob clicks given Eve has sent j-polarized light is
where µ H is Eve's mean photon number and c i is Bob's background click probability per bit slot in i-th channel. The probability P hv (H) that after squashing Bob measures in the HV basis, given Eve has sent an H-polarized pulse, is composed of three events: when only detector H clicks, when only detector V clicks, or when both click. It can be written as
Let's now include Alice into the picture. Consider Alice sends an H-polarized pulse, and Eve intercepts it. Let P be the probability that she measures in the non-compatible basis (different basis than Alice's) and gets a click in a single detector. The sifted key rate given Alice has sent H-polarized light is
(3) An error can occur when Eve measures Alice's signal in non-compatible basis or when Eve measures in compatible basis but Bob measures a wrong value due to imperfect visibility or dark count. Hence, the error rate conditioned on Alice sending H-polarized light is
where P i (j) is the probability that Bob measures value i after squashing, given Eve has sent j-polarized light. For example,
(5) Sifted key rates and errors in Eve's presence (Eqs. 3, 4) conditioned on V , D, A polarizations sent by Alice can be calculated similarly. The total sifted key rate and QBER in Eve's presence become
As can be seen from the equations, the only free parameters left for Eve to manipulate are the mean photon numbers of her signal. Knowing the angular scanning data, Eve can use a numerical optimization to find values of µ H , µ V , µ D , µ A that minimize QBER e while keeping R e = R ab , where R ab is Bob's sifted key rate without Eve. Our numerical optimization shows that this is achievable for Alice-Bob channel loss ≥ 3 dB if they are willing to accept a slight increase of QBER by less than 1% (see Fig. 3 ). Here, we assumed Bob's detection efficiency at φ = θ = 0 to be 0.7 in all four channels [27] , and individual detector background probabilities in the range of 430 × 10 −9 to 1560 × 10 −9 per 1 ns wide coincidence window as measured in our experiment. These are realistic conditions for a successful attack on most communication channels [18-21, 23, 24, 26, 27] Note that the distance Eve-Bob can be increased without affecting performance of the attack, by replacing Eve's illuminator with four collimators oriented at the required attack angles.
We went further and imposed an additional constraint on Eve to make Bob's individual detector's sifted key rates equal R e (H) = R e (V ) = R e (D) = R e (A) = R ab . Our optimization shows that it is still possible for Eve to pick appropriate mean photon numbers and successfully attack the system with resultant QBER < 5.5% in 5-15 dB line loss range (Fig. 3) . We remark that similar values of QBER are typical for outdoor channels, because of background light. Eve could shield Bob from the latter to hide the QBER resulting from her attack.
We now propose a countermeasure. In our attack, by sending lights at different angles, Eve has broken a fundamental assumption of security proofs: detection probabilities must be independent of detection basis [34, 35] . Hence, the best countermeasure would be to restore this assumption by placing a spatial filter (pinhole) at the focal plane of Bob's L1 and L2 [ Fig. 1(a) ]. Spatial filtering is sometimes done before the beamsplitters to increase signal-to-background ratio in the channel [21, 22, 25] , however it has not been characterised as a security countermeasure. We have repeated the scanning with pinholes of 100, 75, and 25 µm diameter, and found that decreasing the diameter gradually reduces the mismatch. The 25 µm diameter pinhole eliminates any significant mismatch (Fig. 4) . Even though we have reduced the search parameters to η i (j) ≥ 0.001 and δ i ≥ 4, no attack angles could be found. This pinhole size provides Bob with a field-of-view of 100 µrad, which does not reduce his efficiency with turbulent atmospheric channels [23] . Hence we conclude that a 25 µm pinhole may be an efficient countermeasure for the current setup.
Since our analysis implies that data obtained during a QKD session can be explained by an intercept-resend attack by an eavesdropper exploiting the spatial mode side-channels, there is no postprocessing or privacy amplification that can eliminate Eve's knowledge without sacrificing all key [36] . Although our practical attack should work, and the physical countermeasure seems to be promising, there is still room for improvement on both the attack scheme and countermeasures. Eve can employ more attack angles or combine this attack with some other suitable attack schemes, to increase the number of her free parameters. Alice and Bob can make this harder by monitoring more parameters. We expect that (Fig. 1) . No detectable mismatch between channels was found under tight search conditions ηi(j) ≥ 0.001 and δi(j) ≥ 4.
our attack can be conducted also in the related decoystate protocol [37] , though the requirement to match the correct decoy statistics will modify the parameter regime where it will be effective. Another possible future study is to fully implement the present attack under realistic outdoor channel conditions.
